Kenneth K. Bradford and Tammy Bradford v. Michael Alvey and Vaughn Alvey, D/B/A C. Howard Alvey & Sons, A Partnership; and Michael E. Crowley, A General Partner, D/B/A Micro Investment : Respondents\u27 Michael and Vaughn Alvey\u27S Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Kenneth K. Bradford and Tammy Bradford v.
Michael Alvey and Vaughn Alvey, D/B/A C.
Howard Alvey & Sons, A Partnership; and Michael
E. Crowley, A General Partner, D/B/A Micro
Investment : Respondents' Michael and Vaughn
Alvey'S Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald L. Poulton; Attorney for Respondents;Randall S. Feil; Attorney for Respondents Michael
Alvey and Vaughn Alvey; Grant A. Hurst; Attorneys for Appellants
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Bradford v. Alvey, No. 16829 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2052
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH K. BRADFORD and 




MICHAEL ALVEY and 
VAUGHN ALVEY, d/b/a/ 
C. HOWARD ALVEY & SONS, 
a Partnership; and 
MICHAELE. CROWLEY, a 
General Partner, d/b/a 




Case No. 16829 
RESPONDENTS' MICHAEL AND VAUGHN ALVEY'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Judgment in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, Judge 
Grant A. Hurst 
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Ronald L. Poulton 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
Michael E. Croawley 
Randall S. Feil 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Michael Alvey and Vaughn Alvey 
F ~ t ED 
MAY 13 1980 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL . 
. . . . . . . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ... . . . . . 





. . 2 
THAT THE FAILURE OF APPELLANTS TO OBTAIN 
FINANCING AFTER SEVENTEEN MONTHS WAS 
UNREASONABLE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
A. This Is An Action At Law Because The 
Appellants Are Not Entitled To Specific 
Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
B. The Trial Court's Judgment Must Be 
Sustained If Supported By Substantial 
Evidence. . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
C. The Trial Court's Judgment Is Supported 
II. 
By The Preponderance Of The Evidence ...... 10 
1. Because the Appellants Have Failed 
to Urge Error As to Alternative 
Findings Which Justify the Judgment 
Below, That Judgment Must Be Affirmed ... 11 
2. The Trial Court's Finding That The 
Appellants Failed to Satisfy the 
Condition Precedent to Performance 
is Supported by a Preponderance of 
the Evidence . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
3. The Trial Court's Finding That A 
Reasonable Time for Performance of 
the Contract Had Passed is Supported 
by the Preponderance of the Evidence . . . 12 
4. The Trial Court's Finding That the 
Appellants Failed to Use Reasonable 
Diligence in Obtaining Financing is 
Supported by the Preponderance of 
The Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
THE EXCLUSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
OF MR. HERZOG IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR . . . . . 16 
(i} 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A. The Trial Court's Exclusion Of Testimony 
Is Not Reversible Err Because The Appellants 
Failed to Make The Required Offer Of Proof ... 16 
B. The Excluded Testimony Was Not Admissible 
On The Theory That Herzog Was The Alveys' 
Agent Or That He Was Authorized To Speak 
For The Alveys ........ . 
1. Herzog was not the Alveys' agent 
merely because they listed their 
21 
property for sale with him . . . . . 21 
2. The Alveys made no representations 
that would justify a finding of 
agency by estoppel . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
3. The excluded testimony is not 
admissible under Rule 63 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence . . . . . . . 26 
III THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ..... 27 
A. Evidence Admitted Without Objection 
That Is Relevant To Another Issue In 
The Case, Cannot Be Used To Show That 
An Unpleaded Issue Was Tried By Implied 
Consent . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
B. Whatever The Alveys' Intent Was Prior To 
March, 1979, They Were Free To Cancel 
The Agreement In April, 1979. . . .... 29 
IV THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE APPELLANTS FAILED 
TO INTRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES AT 
THE TIME OF BREACH. . . . . . . . 30 
v CONCLUSION. _. .. . . . . • . . 31 
~ii) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Restatement of Contracts §373 ...... . 
Sufficiency of Real Estate Buyer's Efforts 
to Secure Financing Upon Which Sale Is 
Contingent, 78 A.L.R.3d 880 .. 
CASES CITED 
Anaheim Co. v. Holcomb, 426 P.2d 713 (Ore. 
1967). .-.-.-. . . . . . . . . . . . 
Commercial Security Bank v. Johnson, 10 
Utah 342, 173 P.2d 27T("1'946) .... 
Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P.2d 
7'B't"l %3 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Costa v. Regents of University of California, 
254 P.20 85 (Cal.~pp. 1953) . -....... . 






P:Ld 811 {1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Denver Decorators, Inc. v. Twin Tee)ee 
Lodge, Inc., 431 P.~ TCoro:-1967 ... 
Downey State Bank v. Mager-Blakeney Corp., 
578 P.2d 1286--cTifa'fl"197 ) ........ . 
Elliot v. Whitmore, 23 Utah 343, 65 p. 70 




Flitch Y.:... Boyle, 89 P.2d 912 {Kan. 1939} . . 5 
Fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049 
{I9"30) . • . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . • . • . . • 21 
Friedman v. New York Telephone Co., 176 
N.E. 543 ""{N.Y-:-1'911) ... · · · · · · · · 
Gaffi ~Burns, 563 P.2d 726 (Ore. 1977) . 
22 
8 
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 123 Utah 172, 
256 p. 2d-7"00Tl 951)-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Grittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 
P.2d 1115(1955) ......... · · · · · · · · 7 
(iii) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Gullor~ Corp. v. Dussin Investment Co., 
536 P. d 501 (Ore. 1975) ..... -. -..... 13 
Hardinger~ Till, 96 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1939). . . . . . 30 
Hosner~ Shelly, 164 P.2d 573 (Cal. 1945) . . . . . . 29 
In re Young's Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 P.731 
U90"8") . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
International Harvester Credit v. East 
Coast Truck, 547 F.2d 888 (5th Cir~77). 
18 
29 
Jackson Y.:_ Jackson, 113 Utah 249, 192 P.2d 397 (1948). 9 
Land v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 
no, 151 p. 2d 952 (1960) . -. -. . 9 
Lawlers ~ Calaway, 147 P.2d 604 (Cal. 1944) . 20 
Marker Y.:_ Finch, 322 F.Supp. 905 (D.Del. 1971) . . 9 
Martin~ Vincent, 593 P.2d 45 (Mont. 1979). . . 22 
Martins Y.:_ Franklin, 462 P.2d 853 (Ariz. 1969) . 13 
McBride Y.:_ McBride, 581 P.2d 996 (Utah 1978) 9 
Moss~ Vadman, 463 P.2d 159 (Wash. 1969). . 21 
Mossir Y.:_ Cyrus, 199 P.485 (Ore. 1911) 
National Farmers Union Prozerty and 
Casualt§ Co. v. Thompson, Utah~ 7, 286 
p. 2d 24 (1958). . . . . . . . . . . . 
Northern State Construction Co. v. Robbins, 
457 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1969) .. -.-.-..... . 
Penman v. Emico Corp., 114 Utah 16, 196 
P.2d 984(1948) ............ . 
Phoenix Western Holdin~ ~orp. v. Gleeson, 
500 P.2d 320 (Ariz. 19 2 ..• - .•...• 






100(Iq49) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
Rivett.~ Nelson, 322 P.2d 515 (Cal. 1958) 24 
Sorenson~ Connelly, 536 P.2d 328 (Colo. 1975). . 11 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Superior Court, In and For Pinia 
County-, 586 P.2d 1313 (Ariz.--r97g-y-.... 
Stevenson v. Thrush, 219 P.2d 977 (Wash. 
1977) ... -. . . . . . . .... 
Stewart v. Cunningham, 548 P.2d 740 
{Kans. 197 6) . . . . . . . . • . . . 
Stiles.,,v. Edwards, 53 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. App.} 
aff'd, 5"& S.E.2d 260 (Ga. 1949}. 
Stone~ Harmon, 19 N.W.8 (Minn. 1894} . 
Suhre Y.:._ Busch, 120 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. 1938} . 
Woodhouse Y.:._ Powles, 86 P.1063 (Wash. 1906}. 
RULES CITED 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 5 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 63. 












Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH K. BRADFORD and 




MICHAEL ALVEY and 
VAUGHN ALVEY, d/b/a 
C. HOWARD ALVEY & SONS, 
a Partnership; and 
MICHAELE. CROWLEY, a 
General Partner, d/b/a 




Case No. 16829 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth Bradford, 
seek specific performance, or in the alternative, damages for the 
breach of an Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to Purchase (Exhibit 
1). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court below granted judgment for the Defendants-
Respondents Michael and Vaughn Alvey and Defendant-Respondent 
Michael E. Crowley holding that a condition precedent to the 
agreement becoming binding was never satisfied, a reasonable time 
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for performance of the contract had passed, the Bradfords failed 
to reasonably pursue financing, and that no evidence 
introduced regarding damages at the time of breach. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
was 
The Alveys, respondents, seek to have the trial court's 
judgment affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Michael and Vaughn Alvey (hereinafter Alveys) are 
partners doing business as C. Howard Alvey and Sons, a general 
partnership. (T.110). Barney Alvey is the brother of Michael and 
Vaughn Alvey. (T.110). Barney Alvey is not in partnership with 
his brothers, but is an employee of the partnerhip acting as 
foreman of construction. (T.111). Pam Tazzer was an employee of 
the partnership working as a secretary in the partnership's 
business office. (T.43,111). 
Midvalley Investment is a corporation in the business of 
selling real estate. (T.110). Michael Herzog is a realtor 
employed by Midvalley Investment. Midvalley's office is in the 
same building as C. Howard Alvey and Sons' office, but these are 
completely separate businesses, being on the first and second 
floors of the building, respectively. (T.42,43). 
In February, 1978 the appellants telephoned Midvalley 
Investment and spoke with Michael Herzog concerning their desire 
-2-
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to purchase a house in the Shiloh subdivision in West Jordan, 
Utah. (T.32). A few days after the appellants had telephoned 
Midvalley, Herzog visited the appellants at their home. At that 
time the appellants signed an earnest money agreement wherein they 
offered to purchase a house to be constructed in the Shiloh 
subdivision. (T.32), Exhibit 1. At the appellants' request, 
Herzog presented the offer to the Alveys. (T.57,103.) The Alveys 
accepted the appellants' offer to purchase on or about February 
22, 1978. Exhibit 1. The Earnest Money Agreement did not specify 
a completion date; it provided, however, that the sale was 
conditioned on the appellants' obtaining FHA financing. Exhibit 
1. 
-A few days after the appellants' offer to purchase had 
been accepted, Herzog arranged a loan prequalif ication meeting 
with American Home Mortgage. (T.35). No formal application for a 
loan was made at that time and no loan commitment was ever issued 
by American Home Mortgage. {T.35). 
The appellants did not make a formal application for an 
FHA loan until March 12, 1979. (T.5). Even then, this FHA loan 
application did not result in a commitment being issued because in 
March, 1979 FHA loan application policies and procedures required 
that the house be nearly complete before an FHA loan could be made. 
(T.5,14). However, if the application had been made at the time 
the Earnest Money Agreement was entered, in February of 1978, an 
FHA loan commitment good for six months could have been granted 
- ") _ 
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even though the house was just in the initial stages of 
construction. (T.173-175). A conventional loan commitment was 
eventually issued in July, 1979, long after this litigation had 
been commenced, as a result of an application for a conventional 
loan application made on June 25, 1979. (T.5-6). 
At no time between February, 1978 and March, 1979 did 
the appellants demand that the Alveys complete the house and 
tender performance. (T.58). In October, 1978 the appellants sold 
the duplex they were living in and purchased another house with 
the proceeds of the sale ($15,000). (T.46,47,66,67). 
About the first of April the appellants learned from 
Michael Alvey that the Alveys had sold the Shiloh subdivision to 
Michael E. Crowley, a respondent here. (T.102). The appellants 
called Crowley who denied that he had any legal obligation to 
perform on the Earnest Money Agreement. (T. 53). On April 30, 
1979, the appellants initiated this action. 
In May, 1979 the appellants borrowed $17,000 from one of 
the appellants' parents. The appellants are paying the money back 
at $275 a month. (T.48,49,63). The testimony is conflicting as to 
whether the money was a gift or a loan. (T.48,49,62,63). The 
trial court believed the testimony that the $17,000 was a loan. 
See Findings of Fact 1T5. The conventional loan commitment 
received in July, 1979, which was part of the appellants' alleged 
tender of payment made that month (T.50, Exhibit 10), was invalid 
and ineffective because the $17,000 was a loan. (T.11). 
-4-
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I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING 
THAT THE FAILURE OF APPELLANTS TO OBTAIN 
FINANCING AFTER SEVENTEEN MONTHS WAS UNREASONABLE 
A. This is an Action at Law Because the Appel-
lants are not Entitled to Specific Performance 
Before the court reviews the complete record and passes 
on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence based on the 
appellants' claim that this is an equitable action for specific 
performance, the court must determine whether the appellants would 
be entitled to specific performance of the Earnest Money Agreement 
if it were enforceable. Otherwise the appellants could have what 
is in reality an action in law for damages decided under the 
expanded scope of review reserved for equity cases. Utah's 
Constitution expressly provides that " ... in cases at law the 
• 
appeal shall be on questions of law alone .... " Utah Const. Art. 
VIII § 9. 
Assuming the earnest money agreement were enforceable, 
and it is not, the appellants are not entitled to specific 
performance because they are not now, nor were they ever able to 
perform their part of the contract. 
It is elementary that specific performance of a 
contract will not be ordered unless the one who 
seeks to enforce it has performed his part of 
the contract or is able to perform and offers 
to do so. Flitch v. Boyle, 89 P.2d 912 (Kan. 
1939). ~ 
-5-
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Specific performance is properly denied where it appears that one 
party to the agreed exchange will not be able to perform as agreed. 
See Restatement of Contract §373. Even where tender is excused, 
specific performance will be denied when the party seeking specific 
performance was never able to perform. Suhre v. Busch, 120 S.W.2d 
47 (Mo. 1938). 
The appellants are not now ready and able to perform, nor 
have they ever been. The appellants ~ade two separate applications 
for loans for the purpose of trying to perform on the contract. The 
first application did not result in a loan commitment. (T. 5). 
Though the second application resulted in a commitment being made, 
the trial court found that the loan commitment was "invalid, 
unenforceable and of no effect." Findings of Fact •S. 
The trial court 1 s finding that the loan commitment that 
resulted from the second loan application was "invalid, 
unenforceable and of no effect". is fully supported by the evidence. 
It was the uncontradicted testimony of A. Thompson Calder, regional 
vice president of the lending institution that issued the loan 
commitment on the second application, that if the appellants had 
listed the $17, 000 borrowed from the parents of appellant Mr. 
Bradford's parents that the loan commitment would not have been 
issued. (T.13). Mr. Calder also testified that the appellants, 
having borrowed the $17,000 for the down payment would not have 
,,. 
qualified for a loan on the date of trial. (T.9). Mr. Calder 
further testified, again without contradiction, that the loan 
-6-
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commitment that was granted would have been invalid if the $17,000 
down payment had to be borrowed. (T .11, 13, 14). Al though 
appellant Mr. Bradford's testimony was conflicting regarding the 
circumstances under which he received the $17,000 from his parents, 
the trial court obviously concluded that his earlier testimony that 
the $17,000 was a loan was the more credible testimony. See Finding 
of Fact 1f5. This court has generally left the question of a 
witness's credibility to the trial judge because of trial judge's 
advantaged position in being able to observe the demeanor of the 
witness. Grittens ~Lundberg, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115 {1955). 
Appellant Mr. Bradford testified as follows: 
Q. Is it true you .were asked in your 
deposition . . . [where] you were to get the 
money [and] from who[m] and isn't it true that 
you answered ["]my parents["]? 
A. I guess. 
Q. Is it also true that you were asked 
["].was it a gift["] and you said in answer to 
that question ["]no I"]. I guess I wouldn't 
call it a gift.{"] 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Weren't you also asked ["]did you have 
to pay them back ["] and wasn't your answer 
["]yes?["] 
A. I guess it was. 
Q. And isn't it true that you were asked 
how much of it they gave you exactly and isn't 
it true you answered approximately $17,000? 
-7-
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A. Yes. 
Q. Were you also asked ["]when did you 
have to pay them back ["] and did you answer 
[" ] I am paying them back monthly right now? [ "] 
A. Yes. 
Q. And were you asked ["]how much["] and 
did you answer ["]$275?["] 
A. Yes. 
Q. Isn't it true that you did not tell 
Mason McDuf fy or their representative you had a 
debt to your parents in the amount of $17,000? 
A. That is true. I didn't tell them. (T. 
62, 63). (Quotation marks added for clarity.) 
Appellant Mr. Bradford also testified that the appellants did 
not have the cash to purchase the house, and that he was not ready 
or able to perform his obligations under the Earnest Money 
Agreement at anytime between October, 1978 and May, 1979. (T. 67-
69). 
Furthermore, even if the contract had been repudiated, 
the appellants are not entitled to specific performance. A 
seller's repudiation of a contract does not excuse a purchaser who 
seeks specific performance of the contract from pleading and 
proving that he is ready, willing, and able to perform his 
obligations under the contract. Gaffi ~Burns, 563 P.2d 726 (Ore. 
1977). The court in Gaffi, supra, rejected the buyer's contention 
that where the buyer had failed to show at trial that they were 
"ready and able" to perform under the contract that specific 
performance should be granted conditioned on payment of the 
contract price within a specified time. 
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.. 
B. The Trial Court's Judgment Must be Sustained 
If Supported by Substantial Evidence 
The appellants' action is not an action in equity, but an 
action at law for damages. Accordingly, the court's review of the 
evidence is limited to determining whether it is sufficient to 
sustain the judgment. Penman Y..:_ Emico Corp., 114 Utah 16, 196 P.2d 
984 (1948). Jackson~ Jackson, 113 Utah 249, 192 P.2d 397 (1948). 
In cases at law the court "will not redetermine facts 
found by the fact finder in the lower court . . . if in the light 
most favorable to the respondent the evidence is sufficient to 
sustain such findings." Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 123 Utah 
172, 256 P.2d 706 (1953). The evidence is sufficient to sustain a 
judgment if there is substantial evidence from which reasonable 
minds would believe facts which will support the judgment. Land v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 376, 351 P.2d 952 (1960). The 
evidence may be substantial enough to support the judgment even 
though it is less than a preponderance of the evidence. See Marker 
~Finch, 322 F.Supp. 905 (D. Del. 1971). 
However, even were this an equitable action this court 
has recognized that it should not reverse a case just because it may 
have decided the matter differently on the facts. See Del Porto~ 
Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 {1972). There is a presumption 
that the trial court's findings and judgment are correct even in 
equity cases. Id. In McBride Y.!_ McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 
1978}, this court said that! 
-9-
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While ~t is the responsibility of this court 
t~ review ~he evidence in equity cases, it 
will not disturb the findings of fact made 
below unless they appear to be clearly 
er1:"oneous and against the weight of the 
evidence. In conducting our review of the 
evidence we are mindful of the advantaged 
position of the trial judge who sees and hears 
the witnesses and we are contrained to give 
due deference to his decisions by reason 
thereof. (footnote omitted). 
This court has specifically held that in actions for 
specific performance the evidence is reviewed in the light most 
favorable to the findings and that the findings will not be 
disturbed unless the evidence clearly preponderates against them. 
Cook~ Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P.2d 78 (1963). 
C. The Trial Court's Judgment is Supported by 
the Preponderance of the Evidence. 
The law is not in dispute in this case. Before a binding, 
enforceable contract ever comes into existence all conditions 
precedent to performance must be satisfied. Where, as here, the 
Earnest Money Agreement does not specify the time in which the 
financing must be obtained or the time in which the parties must 
perform, the law will imply that a reasonable time was contemplated 
in each instance. Commercial Security Bank ~ Johnson, 10 Utah 
342, 173 P.2d 277 (1946}. The law also implies in cases like this 
where the agreement for the sale of real property is expressly made 
subject to the buyer obtaining financing the buyer makes a promise 
implied in law to use reasonable diligence to procure such 
-10-
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financing. Sorenson v. Connelly, 536 P. 2d 328 (Colo. 197 5); 
Anaheim Co. Y!.. Holcombe, 426 P.2d 713 (Ore. 1967); "Sufficiency of 
Real Estate Buyer's Efforts to Secure Financing Upon Which Sale is 
Contingent," 78 A.L.R. 3d 880. 
1. Because the Appellants Have Failed to Urge 
Error As To Alternative Findings Which 
Justify the Judgment Below, That Judgment 
Must Be Affirmed 
The following issues were raised at trial: (1) did the 
appellants obtain FHA fina_ncing so as to satisfy the condition 
precedent to either parties obligation to perform; (2) did the 
appellants obtain financing within a reasonable time after the 
contract was entered; and (3) did the appellants use reasonable 
diligence in obtaining financing. At trial all these issues were 
decided against the appellants. Findings of Fact '10; Conclusions 
of law ~~2,4. If the answers to any of the above questions is in 
the negative the trial court's judgment must be affirmed. The 
appellants choose only to raise and argue the last question. 
Appellants' Docketing System '5; Appellants Brief. Where a 
question is not urged in the printed brief on appeal, the question 
is deemed to have been decided properly below. Reid v. Anderson, 
116 Utah 465, 211 P.2d 206 (1949). If the trial court's judgment 
may be sustained on grounds not urged on appeal the trial court's 
judgment must be affirmed without considering the errors urged on 
appeal. Id. Accordingly, judgment for the Alveys must be 
affirmed. In any event, the trial court's findings on all the 
-11-
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issues are supported by the preponde:rance of the evidence and-
judgment must be affirmed on appeal. 
2. The Trial Court's Finding That The 
Appellants Failed to Satisfy the 
Condition Precedent to Performance is 
Supported by a Preponderance of the 
Evidence. 
The performance of the Earnest Money Agreement by either 
the appellants or the Alveys was conditioned on the appellants 
obtaining FHA financing. Exhibit 1. The appellant did apply for 
FHA financing but no FHA loan commitment was ever issued. (T.5). 
The appellants did obtain a conventional loan commitment. This, 
however, did not satisfy the condition precedent which required FHA 
financing. Moreover, as already discussed, the court properly 
found that this conventional loan commitment to be invalid, 
unenforceable and of no effect. Therefore, the appellants failed 
to satisfy a condition precedent essential to the formation of an 
enforceable contract, and there is no contract to be breached or 
enforced. 
3. The Trial Court's Finding That a 
Reasonable Time for Performance of 
the Contract had Passed is Supported 
by the Preponderance of the Evidence. 
A reasonable time for performance of a contract is 
determined by ascertaining the intention of the parties' as 
determined from the facts and circumstances at the time the 
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contract was entered. See Stewart~ Cunningham, 548 P.2d 740, 745 
(Kans. 197 6) ; Martins ~ Franklin, 462 P. 2d 853 (Ariz. 1969). At 
the time the contract was entered it seems obvious that neither 
party intended to be bound by the earnest money agreement after the 
lapse of seventeen months. Normally a house can be built in about 
three months. (T .155). At the inception of the contract the 
appellants did not expect to be bound by the contract if the Alveys 
had failed to perform after seventeen months had elapsed. 
Moreover, at today's rates of inflation no builder would intend to 
be bound by a seventeen month old contract price. Since the 
condition precedent to performance was not satisfied within a 
reasonable time for performing the contract, and since neither 
party to the contract pe.rformed within a reasonable time, the 
contract expired and both parties are excused from performing. See 
Gullory Corp. Y.:_ Dussin Investment Co., 536 P.2d 501 (Ore. 1975). 
4. The Trial Court's Finding That the 
Appellants Failed to Use Reasonable 
Diligence in Obtaining Financing is 
Supported by the Preponderance of the 
Evidence. 
The trial court's findings that a reasonable time had 
passed for performance of the contract, and that the appellants 
failed· to use reasonable digiligence in obtaining financing are 
supported by the preponderance of the evidence as demonstrated by 
the record and the judgment below should be affirmed. 
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The record shows that: at the time the Earnest Money 
Agreement was entered FHA financing was available to the appellants 
(T. 21-23, 173-175); the appellants never made an application for 
an FHA loan, or any loan, until almost thirteen months after the 
Earnest Money Agreement had been executed; (T. 21-23. 173-175); 
that during the delay in making application for an FHA loan in 
satisfaction of the condition precedent to performance on the 
contract, FHA loan proce~ures were changed so that the appellants 
could no longer obtain an FHA loan prior to one hundred percent 
completion of the house (T.5, 14, 21); the appellants never did 
receive an FHA loan (T .14); the usual practice in the housing trade 
is for the buyer to obtain financing before the home is completed 
(T.184); the usual practice in the housing trade is for buyers to 
make written application for a loan a few· days after the earnest 
money agreement is executed (T.181); the uncontradicted testimony 
of a builder, a real estate broker, and a mortgage lender was that a·· 
reasonable time for a buyer to obtain financing would not exceed 
ninety days from the date of the earnest money agreement (T.147, 
181, 184); and finally, the appellants did not obtain a 
conventional loan commitment until seventeen months after the 
Earnest Money Agreement was entered and then that financing 
commitment was invalid.. Courts have held delays of less than 
twelve and ten months in the exercise of option agreements 
unreasonable. Mossir v. Cyrus, 119 P. 485 (Ore. 1911); Stone Y..:.. 
Harmon, 19 N.W. 8 (Minn. 1894). 
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Also relevant on the issue of reasonable diligence, are 
the burdens placed on the Alveys by the appellants' delay in 
obtaining financing. As was testified to by Michael Alvey, his 
company had begun the house in question on a speculation basis, 
using limited speculation funds. (T .133). Until financing was 
obtained by the appellants, the Alveys had to count this house as 
one of their speculation houses and could not begin in its place 
another speculation house with speculation financing. (T .132). 
The Alveys understood, in accord with the usual practice, that they 
did not have to complete the home until the appellants had obtained 
financing (T.144). If the Alveys completed the home before they 
were assured that the appellants had financing, they would have 
risked creating serious cash flow problems and being left with a 
custom home that was unmarketable because it may not have conformed 
to normal buyer preferences in housing. (T .104 ,141). 
The appellants place great emphasis on the reason for 
their failure to obtain financing as was their responsibility under 
the Earnest Money Agreement. The reason given is, in short, that 
they were aware that the house was not yet completed. The fact that 
the house was not completed is not justification for the delay 
given the sound general practice in the housing trade that the 
buyer obtain financing prior to completion to alleviate the great 
risks born by the builder if he completes the house prior to the 
time the buyer has obtained financing, and the sale fails· 
Furthermore, under the FHA loan procedure in effect at the time the 
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Earnest Money Agreement was entered, and under conventional loan 
procedures then and now, a loan commitment can be obtained prior to 
completion of the house that will remain good during the time it 
normally takes to complete the home. (T.15, 142, 175). Therefore, 
the court should imply a duty on the buyers part to obtain financing 
before the house is completed where obtaining financing is a 
condition precedent to performance for the protection of the. 
builder. This results in no prejudice to the buyer whatsoever. 
that: 
II. 
THE EXCLUSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
OF MR. HERZOG IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
A. The Trial Court's Exclusion of Testimony 
Is not Reversible Err Because the Appellants 
Failed to Make the Required Off er of Proof 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence expressly provides 
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, 
nor shall the judgment or decision based 
thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence unless (a) it appears of 
record that the proponent of the evidence 
either made known the substance of the evidence 
in a form and by a method approved by the 
judge, or indicated the ~ubst<:1nc~ o~ the 
expected evidence by questions 1ndic.ati.ng the 
desired answers, and (b} the court which passes 
upon the effect or-the error or ~rrors is of 
the opinion that the excluded evidence would 
probably have had a substantia~ influe~ce.in 
bringing about a different verdict or finding. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The appellants fail to satisfy any of the requirements of Rule -5 
with respect to the testimony they claim was excluded by error. 
From an examination of the record, anyone can see that 
the appellants never made known the substance of the excluded 
evidence by either method approved by the judge or by questions 
indicating desired answers. (T.32-33, 35). The transcript shows 
that Mr. Bradford was asked: 
Q. Were the terms of that earnest money 
receipt discussed at the time with Mr. Herzog? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. And referring to line 21 of that 
agreement, will you read that? 
A. Says subject to buyer obtaining 
financing, FHA. 
Q. How did that come to be placed in the 
agreement? 
A. Mike Herzog told us that .... (T.32-
33). 
At that point an objection was made and sustained. No proffer of 
the substance of the testimonies was made, nor did the appellant 
seek to have the hearsay statement admitted for other than the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
Subsequently, Mr. Bradford was asked: 
Q. Did you ever get a loan commitment 
form from American Home Mortgage? 
A. No, we did not. 
-17-
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Q. Why not? --
A. We were told at the pre-qualification . 
. (T.35). 
At this point an objection was made and sustained. No proffer of 
the substance of the hearsay statements were made, nor did the 
appellants seek to have the hearsay statements admitted for other 
than the truth of the matter asserted. The record in this instance 
does not even disclose who had made the hearsay statments. Also, 
the statement is properly excluded for lack of foundation. 
The appellants assert that in this situation proffer of 
the substance of the evidence was unnecessary notwithstanding the 
explicit requirement of Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
appellant cites In re Young's Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 P. 731 (1908) 
as support for their position. Initially it should be noted that in 
re Young's Estate was decided before Utah's adoption of Rule 5 of 
the .Utah Rules of Evidence. The court in In re Young's Estate: 
supra, subscribed to the general rule that adequate proffers of 
proof are required before an error based on the improper exclusion 
of evidence can be appealed. The court, however, in that case found 
an exception to the general rule on the narrow ground that an 
adequate offer of proof could not have been made under the 
circumstances. The exception to the proffer rule found in In re 
Young's Estate is certainly not applicable here. 
The appellant also cites several cases from other 
jurisdictions for the proposition that " [a ]n offer of proof is 
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unnecessary where the nature of the error is otherwise clear.,,-
Appellants' Brief p. 23. These cases are irrelevant because Rule 5 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence is controlling and determinative. 
See also Downey State Bank~ Mayor-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 
(Utah 1978). Furthermore, as is discussed below, the evidence does 
not show that the realtor, Herzog, was Alvey's agent for purposes 
of the statements made by Herzog that are claimed to have been 
excluded by error. Hence, it was not, and is not, clear that the 
excluded hearsay statements were improperly excluded, and an offer 
of proof is required before such an alleged error can be reviewed on 
appeal even under the rule the appellants advocate. 
In Denver Decorators, Inc. ~Twin Teepee Lodge, Inc .. 
431 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1967), the appellant there had sought at trial to 
question a witness on a conversation which the witness had had with 
a real tor. The testimony was objected to and excluded on the ground 
that there was an insufficient showing of agency relationship 
between the realtor and the respondent. No offer of proof was made. 
The court on appeal concluded that: 
In this particular circumstance, there having 
been made no offer of proof, we would not be 
justified in reversing judgment even if the 
trial court committed technical error in 
excluding this line of testimony. Id. at 10. 
Appellants, again relying on authority from other juris-
dictions for support, argue that the proffer was excused because a 
prof fer of evidence is unnecessary where the court excludes an 
entire class of evidence. Appellants' Brief p. 23. Rule 5 of the 
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Utah Rules of Evidence makes the applicability of this principle in 
Utah questionable at best. In any event, the appellants have 
misapplied the rule in this instance. The trial judge in this case 
did not make a sweeping ruling in this case excluding all evidence 
on a theory or issue as was the case in Costa ~ Regents of 
University of California, 254 P.2d 85 (Cal.App. 1953) and Lawlers 
Y..:_ Calaway, 147 P. 2d 604 (Cal. 1944). The trial judge in this 
instance excluded testimony based on specific questions and 
specific objections. The appellants were free after the rulings 
excluding the testimony to admit any evidence they had on any 
relevant issue in the case, including the agency issue, so long as 
the evidence was not excluded by some rule of evidence. 
Moreover, where, as here, the testimony is excluded on 
hearsay grounds and the proponent of the testimony fails to argue 
at trial the theory that the evidence was offered to show state of 
mind rather than for the truth of the matter asserted, he may not on 
appeal claim that it was error to exclude the evidence on that 
theory. See Northern State Construction Co. ~Robbins, 457 P.2d 
187 (Wash. 1969}. 
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B. The Excluded Testimony was not Admissible On 
the Theory that Herzog was the Alveys' Agent or 
that he was Authorized to Speak For the Alveys 
1. Herzog was not the Alveys' agent Merely 
because they listed their Property for 
sale with him 
The fact that the Alveys were officers in Midvalley is 
irelevant for purposes of determining whether Midvalley and Herzog 
were actual agents for the Alveys because no evidence was 
introduced to show that Midvalley was the Alveys' alter ego. An 
agency relationship results from the manifestation of consent by 
one person that another shall act on his behalf and subject to his 
control, with a corresponding manifestation of consent by one 
person that another shall act on his behalf and under his control. 
State ~ Superior. Court, In and For Pinia County, 586 P.2d 1313 
(Ariz. 1978); Moss Y.:_ Vadman, 463 P.2d 159 (Wash. 1969}. Whether 
one is the agent of another depends upon the right of control by one 
over the other. Fox ~ Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049 (1936). 
There is no evidence in the record showing that the Alveys, in their 
capacity as sellers, had the right to control Herzog's actions or 
the methods by which he obtained purchasers for the Alveys' 
property. Furthermore, there is no evidence that either the Alveys 
or Herzog made the manifestations of consent necessary to the 
creation of an agency relationship. 
The appellants' contend that the existence of a seller-
realtor relationship between the Alveys and Midvalley is sufficient 
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to make the realtor, Mr. Herzog, the agent of the seller, the 
Alveys, for purposes of making representations. None of the cases 
relied upon by the appellants, however, directly support this 
position. 
A real estate broker does not have general authority to 
act for the seller. Martin~ Vincent, 593 P.2d 45 (Mont. 1979). A 
real estate broker is ordinarily an independent contractor 
authorized only to find a purchaser. Stiles ~Edwards, 53 S.E.2d 
697 (Ga. App. 1949); aff'd, 58 S.E.2d 260; see Friedman v. New York 
Telephone Co., 176 N.E. 543 (N.Y. 1931). In the absence of an 
express agency granting a real estate agent greater authority, the 
authority implied from the listing of property with a real estate 
agent is that of a special agent with limited powers. Stevenson v. 
Thrush, 219 P.2d 977 (Wash. 1977). A real estate agent has no 
authority to make representations on behalf of a seller in the 
absence of a showing of actual authority. Stevenson, supra; 
Stiles, supra. 
Contrary to the appellants' assertions, the original 
Earnest Money Agreement was not entered into with the real tor 
acting on behalf of the Alveys. The realtor, Herzog, prepared the 
earnest money agreement in the form of an offer. The offer was 
signed by the appellants and at their request presented to the 
Alveys. (T.57). The Earnest Money Agreement was not a contract 
until the Alveys had accepted the appellants' offer. Exhibit 1. 
The record shows that Herzog was acting as the appellants' agent 
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when he prepared the offer and submitted it to the Alveys for thelr 
acceptance. (T. 57, 103). Appellant Mr. Bradford testified as 
follows: 
Q. (By Mr. Feil) Did you ask him to 
present this earnest money off er on your behalf 
to the Alveys? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you know if he presented the 
offer to the Alveys on your behalf? 
A. As far as I know he did, yes. 
Q. And brought it back to you saying he 
had done what you asked him to do? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the off er had been accepted? 
A. Yes. 
(T.57). 
Appellant Mrs. Bradford testified as follows: 
Q. Mrs. Bradford, is it true that Mike 
Herzog acted as your agent, who actually 
prepared the Earnest Money for you; that's 
Plaintiff's Exhibit l? 
A. Yes. 
Moreover, whatever implied special agency existed between 
the Alveys and Herzog ended when the contract was accepted by the 
Alveys because a realtor's authority is limited to finding a 
purchaser. The testimony that the appellants' claim was improperly 
excluded related to conversations had after the Earnest Money 
Agreement had been accepted, and after any agency relation that may 
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have existed between the Alveys and the realtor, Herzog, had come 
to an end. (T.35). Appellants' Brief p 3. Where, as here, the 
realtor has no authority to make the sale binding, the appellants 
were bound to know the extent of the realtors authority. Friedman, 
supra. 
2. The Alveys made no representations 
that would justify a finding of 
agency by estoppel. 
Appellants argue that Herzog was Alveys' agent by 
application of the doctrine of agency by estoppel. The acts 
creating an agency by estoppel must be performed by the principal 
with knowledge or a reasonable ground for believing that the other 
party will rely thereon and -change his position for the worst. 
Phoenix Western Holding Corp. ~ Gleeson, 500 P. 2d 320 (Ariz. 
1972). The statements or acts of the alleged agent will not 
establish an agency by estoppel. Rivett v. Nelson, 322 P.2d 515 
(Cal. 1958). 
None of the facts upon which the appellants rely to show 
agency by estoppel are statements or acts made by the Alveys. The 
appellants repeatedly testified that they had no contact with the 
Alveys, so no statements by them could have lead appellants to 
believe that Herzog was acting as their agent. (T.64, 82, 105). 
The core of the appellants' agency by estoppel argument 
is that the Alveys were officers of Midvalley Investment. That 
fact alone is not sufficient to establish an agency by estoppel. 
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Moreover, while the appellants knew at the time of trial that the 
Alveys were officers of Midvalley, there is no evidence in the 
record that at the time Herzog made representations to the Alveys 
that they knew the Alveys had anything at all to do with Midvalley 
Investment. (T.34). It is unlikely that they knew the Alveys were 
officers in Midvalley at that time because Herzog's statements were 
made only a few days after the Earnest Money Agreement was signed 
(T.34) and before the appellants had even been to the offices of 
Midvalley. (T.36). 
The fact that the Alveys' office was in the same building 
as that of Midvalley is insignificant for two reasons: (1) the 
offices were on different floors and clearly separate, and (2) the 
appellants' first visit to the building was after the Herzog' s 
statements as to financing had been made. (T.43). The doctrine of 
agency by estoppel should not be applied to statements made by the 
purported agent before the alleged representations or acts 
establishing agency by estoppel have occurred. Also, significant 
as to whether the appellants were lead to believe that Herzog was 
the Alveys' agent is their testimony indicating that at the time 
the offer was made and accepted they believed that Herzog was 
acting for them and not the Alveys. (T.57, 103). 
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3. The excluded testimony is not 
admissible under Rule 63 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
The excluded testimony is inadmissible under either Rule 
63(8)(a) or Rule 63(9)(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence because, as 
discussed above, the statements made by Herzog were not authorized 
by the Alveys nor was Herzog the Alveys' agent. The appellants 
repeatedly rely upon the fact that the Alveys never had personal 
contact with the Bradfords as support for their position that 
Herzog acted for the Alveys in advising the appellants with regard 
to financing. The Earnest Money Agreement defined the respective 
obligations of the parties. The Alveys' only obligation was 
constructing the house. The Alveys never needed to contact the 
appellants regarding the mechanics of obtaining financing, either 
personally or through Herzog, because it was the appellants' 
responsibility and duty to obtain financing. Therefore, it does 
not follow that because the Alveys never personally contacted the 
appellants regarding the financing arrangements that Herzog must 
have acted for the Alveys. 
Rule 63 {9)(a) is inapplicable for the additional reason 
that the judge did not find that Herzog was unavailable as a witness 
and no evidence was introduced showing that he was unavailable. If 
the appellants had produced evidence of unavailability at trial the 
Alveys could have countered it with evidence showing that Herzog 
was available. The showing of unavailablity was not made 
unnecessary by the judge's ruling that Herzog was not the Alveys' 
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agent. The rule expressly requires that the judge find the hearsay 
declarant unavailable as a witness before the hearsay exception is 
applicable. 
The evidence is inadmissible to show the appellants' 
state of mind because their state of mind as induced by Herzog is 
not relevant on the issue of failure to use due diligence to obtain 
financing with respect to the Alveys. The appellants owed the 
Alveys a duty to use due diligence in obtaining financing. The 
representations of Herzog, made on his own and not for the Alveys, 
do not affect that duty. Furthermore, the exclusion of the 
testimony is harmless error because the weight of the evidence, 
even with the ad.mission of the excluded testimony, still favors a 
finding that the appellants failed to use reasonable diligence in 
obtaining financing. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND. 
A. Evidence Admitted Without Objection That 
Is Relevant to Another Issue in the Case, 
Cannot be Used to Show that an Unpleaded 
Issued was Tried by Implied Consent 
Rule lS(b} of Utah's Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that when issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by the 
express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated as 
if they had been raised in the pleadings. The appellants' 
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--
equitable estoppel claim does not fall within this rule. The 
Alveys did not expressly consent to try the issue of equitable 
estoppel, and the issue was not tried by implied consent of the 
parties. The issue of equitable estoppel was not tried at all. 
Though some evidence introduced relevant to other issues in the 
case may have also been relevant to the issue of equitable 
estoppel, the introduction of that evidence without objection did 
not raise the issue of equitable estoppel so that it could be 
considered to have been tried by the implied consent of the 
parties. National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. ~ 
Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249 (1958). In Thompson, supra, 
certain evidence relating to the value of a building, was admitted 
without objection at trial because it was relevant to the pleaded 
issue of insurable interest. On the pleadings there was no value 
issue. The appellant there argued that even though the pleadings 
did not raise the issue of value, the trial·court could properly 
pass on that issue under Rule lS(b). In holding that it would have 
been improper for the trial court to pass on the issue of value 
because the issue had not been tried by the implied consent of the 
parties, the court said: 
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate 
technicalities and liberalize procedure, we 
must not lose sight of the cardinal principle 
that under our system of justice if an issue is 
to be tried and a party's rights concluded with 
respect thereto, he must have notice thereof 
and an opportunity to meet it. Id. at 253 
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Stated simply, the appellants' motion to amend the-
pleadings to conform to the proof was properly denied because the 
introduction of evidence relevant to issues already in the case may 
not be used to show implied consent to trial of a new issue in the 
absence of a clear indication that the evidence was introduced in 
an attempt to raise a new issue. Thompson, supra; International 
Harvester Credit~ East Coast Truck, 547 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(applying Rule lS(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which 
is nearly identical to Utah's Rule 15(b)). 
B. Whatever the Alveys' Intent was Prior to 
March, 1979, they were Free to Cancel 
the Agreement in April, 1979 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is of no aid to the 
petitioners in this case. The doctrine of equitable estoppel does 
not apply to breach of promise as to future conduct. Elliot v. 
Whitmore, 23 Utah 343, 65 P. 70 (1901); Hosner~ Skelly, 164 P.2d 
573 (Cal. 1945). Therefore, even if the Alveys would have been 
estopped from canceling the contract on satisfaction of the 
condition precedent (FHA financing} through March, 1979, they would 
not be estopped from canceling the contract in April when no 
confirmation of financing had been made and the appellants' 
application for financing had actually been rejected. 
No matter what the Alveys' intentions were in March, 
1979, or what the appellants believed them to be, the Alveys were 
free to cancel the contract prior to satisfaction of the condition 
precedent, notwithstanding the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 
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"The intent of a party, however positive and 
fixed, concerning his future conduct with 
respect to such a matter, is necessarily 
uncertain as to its fulfillment, and must 
depend upon contingencies and be subject to 
change and modifications by subsequent events 
and circumstances." Hosner, supra at 577 
(quoting 21 CJS p. 1142.) 
Also, the reasonableness of the appellants' reliance on the 
representations of lower level employees (Barney Alvey and Pam 
Tazzer} and a realtor as to the validity of the contract with the 
Alveys is certainly questionable. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT MUST BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE APPELLANTS FAILED 
TO INTRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE ON DAMAGES AT 
THE TIME OF BREACH 
As previously discussed, the only remedy available to the 
appellants is damages. However, the appellants never introduced 
any evidence on the value of the house at the time of breach --
about April 1, 1979. The expert testimony as to house's value was 
all with respect to its value on or after August 11, 1979. (T.88, 
91). The trial court specifically found that the appellants failed 
to present any evidence regarding the value of the house at the time 
of breach. Findings of Fact ~12. The measure of damages in a 
contract action is the difference between the contract price and 
the fair market value of the property at the time of breach. 
Hardinger~ Till, 96 P.2d 262 (Wash. 1939}. The appellants have 
failed to establish, or even introduce evidence, essential to their 
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recovery in this case. See Woodhouse ~Powles, 86 P. 1063 (Wash. 
1906). Therefore, even if all the other issues were decided in the 
appellants' favor, they would not be entitled to judgment. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's judgment should be affirmed for all or any 
of the following reasons: (1) the record provides substantial 
support for the trial court's finding that the appellants failed to 
use reasonable diligence in obtaining financing; (2} the record 
supports the trial court's finding that a reasonable time had 
passed for performance of the contract when in April, 1979 
respondent Crowley told the appellants that the Earnest Money 
Agreement was not binding; and (3) the record shows that the 
appellants failed to satisfy a condition precedent to performance 
on the contract so no enforceable contract even existed. 
In addition, the appellants failed to introduce evidence at 
trial proving their damages, as was their burden, having failed to 
establish an essential element of their case at trial, they are not 
entitled to have the judgment reversed on appeal. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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1:1~ 
Respectfully submitted this µ'th day of May, 1980. 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused two copies each of the foregoing Brief 
to be delivered to Grant A. Hurst, attorney for the appellants, 68 
South Main, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah; and to Ronald L. 
Poulton, 9 Exchange Place, Suite 420, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
-1.E._ day of May, 1980. 
-33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
